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ABSTRACT 
The United Nations was formed in 1945 in San Francisco; its founding aim 
was to avert catastrophes like World War II. The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) is 
the most powerful organ of the U.N., which is responsible for maintenance of 
international peace. The five permanent members of the UNSC, collectively 
referred to as P5, possess veto power. The composition and power distribution 
among members of the UNSC has remained controversial ever since its 
existence, and therefore, demand has been raised for changing the council’s 
composition and structure.  
Since the inception of the U.N., various reform efforts, especially to 
expand the UNSC, have been attempted from time to time. So far, all have failed. 
Since 2004, the reform process has gained renewed momentum, thanks to the 
interest of various influential countries that are seeking a seat at the UNSC for 
themselves.  
This thesis examines how expanding the UNSC would affect global 
security. Which likely effects would current reform proposals, if approved, have in 
the regions and the world? Finally, the thesis examines the implications for 
Pakistan and the South Asian region, in case India becomes a permanent 
member of the UNSC. 
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The United Nations (U.N.) was formed in 1945 in San Francisco; its 
founding aim was to avert catastrophes like World War II.1 The United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) is the most powerful organ of the U.N., which is 
responsible for maintenance of peace and security in the world.2 After World War 
II, five powerful members of the winning coalition, the United States, Russia 
(formerly the Soviet Union), China, the United Kingdom, and France—collectively 
referred to as the P5—awarded themselves an extraordinary tool: veto power; 
that is, the power to block a resolution even if it is passed by an overwhelming 
majority of the council members.3 The composition and power distribution among 
members of the UNSC has remained controversial ever since its existence. In 
1945 in San Francisco, for example, Brazil demanded a permanent seat for Latin 
America.4 
Since the inception of the U.N., various reform efforts, especially to 
expand the U.N. Security Council, have been attempted from time to time. So far, 
all have failed for many reasons: the resistance of the P5 states in sharing their 
unique status and power, the difficulty of amending the U.N. Charter, and 
complex selection criteria creating a lack of consensus among aspirants5 and 
challengers.6 Since 2004, the reform process has gained renewed momentum 
                                            
1 John Allphin Moore and Jerry Pubantz, The New United Nations: International Organization 
for Twenty-First Century (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), 55. 
2 Adérito R. Vicente, “United Nations Security Council Reform: The Question of the Veto 
Power,” Multilateral Diplomacy Summer School–Student Papers (2013), 21. 
https://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/Multilateral%20Diplomcy%20Paper_final%20ver
sion_online%20publication.pdf#page=20.       
3 Ibid., 56. 
4 Moore and Pubantz, New United Nations, 56. 
5 Terms “aspirants” and “challengers” are used in this paper to denote Group of Four (G4) 
and United for Consensus group (UFC) countries, respectively. 
6 Nadia Sarwar, “Expansion of the United Nations Security Council,” Strategic Studies XXXI, 
no. 3 (September 2011), 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1231703456?accountid=12702. 
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thanks to the interest of various influential countries that are seeking a seat at the 
UNSC for themselves.7  
India has also emerged as one of the strong contenders for a permanent 
seat at the UNSC. India asserts that it is the largest democracy, rising economic 
and military power, and is home to over one billion people, and therefore 
deserves to be represented at the UNSC as a permanent member.8 The current 
enlargement proposals of U.N. Secretary General constituted High Level Panel 
(HLP) on “threats, challenges and change” and Group of Four (G4) countries—
comprising Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India—will have serious implications for 
the world, especially for South Asia. These proposals, if approved, would affect 
the regional balance of power, preclude the necessary consensus on security 
issues, and exacerbate the frustration of the second-tiered countries, such as 
Italy, South Korea, Argentina, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia.9  
India’s collective claim alongside Germany, Brazil, and Japan has raised 
its chances of membership in the reformed UNSC. However, G4 has received 
strong opposition from regional rivals, such as Pakistan, China, South Korea, 
Argentina, Mexico, Italy, and Spain.10 These regional rivals are commonly 
referred to as the “united for consensus” (Ufc) group. Ufc countries are opposed 
to expansion of the UNSC’s permanent membership.11 The group has introduced 
its own enlargement proposal. Apart from expansion in the existing non–
permanent category, the group has also introduced a new category of semi-
                                            
7 Lydia Swart and Cile Pace, “Changing the Composition of the Security Council: Is there 
a Viable Solution?” Center for U.N. Reform Education (March 2015): 1–2. 
8 Shairi Mathur, Voting for the Veto: India in a Reformed U.N., (London: Foreign Policy 
Centre 2005), 20. 
9 Yehuda Z. Blum, “Proposals for U.N. Security Council Reform,” The American Journal of 
International Law 99, no. 3 (July 2005): 632–649, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1602295. 
10 Shiwei Jiang, “U.N. Security Council Reform,” ODU Model of United Nations Society 
(2011): 2–3, https://www.odu.edu/content/dam/odu/offices/mun/2011/legal/issue-brief-2011-un-
security-council-reform.pdf. 
11 Daniel Trachsler, “U.N. Security Council Reform: A Gordian Knot,” Center for Security 
Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 72 (April 2010): 1–3, http://e-
collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:1585/eth-1585-01.pdf?pid=eth:1585&dsID=eth-1585-01.pdf. 
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permanent membership. In this category of semi–permanent membership, 
member countries would be elected for a term of four years with a provision of 
immediate re–election12—in the current system of  nonpermanent membership, 
countries cannot be reelected before a stipulated time. Like current non–
permanent members, the semi–permanent members will not have the privilege of 
veto power. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines how expanding the U.N. Security Council would 
ramify in global security. Which likely effects would the current reform proposals, 
if approved, have in the regions and the world? Finally, the thesis examines the 
implications for Pakistan and the South Asian region in case India becomes a 
permanent member of the UNSC.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The UNSC is the most authoritative institution of the U.N. and the only 
legitimate international organization that can pass binding resolutions, impose 
sanctions, and authorize use of force. Permanent members of the UNSC 
possess veto power that empowers them to block any resolution even if passed 
by majority of the members.13  
The veto power was primarily given to avoid conflicts among states, 
prevent stalemate in the formation of the U.N., and give exclusive authority to the 
P5 to authorize or prevent the use of force through mutually-agreed decisions.14 
However, instead of using the veto power to maintain peace and security, 
permanent members have most often used the veto power in their national 
interest or in the interests of their allies. For instance, during the Cold War, 
                                            
12 Mark Imber, “The Reform of the U.N. Security Council,” International Relations 20, no. 3 
(2006), 331, http://ire.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/content/20/3/328.full.pdf+html. 
13 Ian Hurd, “Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in U.N. Security Council 
Reform,” Global Governance 14, no. 2 (April–June 2008): 199–217, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/27800702;.              
14 Moore and Pubantz, New United Nations, 55. 
 4 
Russia regularly used the veto power to block the membership of newly 
independent countries.15 Similarly, the United States has consistently used veto 
power to protect the national interests of Israel.16 The framers of the charter had 
envisioned a two-tiered council for two reasons: to prevent replicating the 
weaknesses of the League of Nations, and to award extraordinary power to those 
countries that had contributed more to the defeat of the Axis powers.  
Most global powers seek to justify their actions in terms of the U.N. 
Charter or resolutions of the UNSC.17 Membership in the U.N. Security Council is 
seen as bestowing an important political and diplomatic status; thus it is essential 
for countries that seek to play a global leadership role. Acknowledging the 
extraordinary power of the U.N. Security Council and significance that the 
member states attach to it, Edward C. Luck stated: 
At San Francisco and ever since, no reform issue has attracted 
nearly the high-level attention, public interest, or partisan passion 
as the matter of changing the composition, decision-making rules, 
and working methods of the Security Council. This testifies, of 
course, to the importance … that member states and publics alike 
attach to the work of the Council. The core of the debate … has 
revolved around two competing contentions that have proven 
exceedingly difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, it is claimed 
today, as it was vociferously in San Francisco, that the two-tiered 
structure and voting rules of the Council are grossly inequitable. On 
the other hand, it is argued by others with equal conviction that 
these perceived inequities of permanent membership and veto 
power for five big powers are precisely the qualities that have 
allowed the Security Council not only to survive four decades of 
Cold War but to accumulate record achievement and relevance 
unmatched either by other U.N. intergovernmental bodies or by its 
                                            
15 C. L. Lim, “The Great Power Balance, the United Nations and What the Framers Intended: 
In Partial Response to Hans Köchler,” Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 
10, 2007), 309, doi:10.1093/chinesejil/jmm008.  
16 Lowe, Vaughan, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zuan, ed., The United 
Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, 2008), 20. 
17 Imber, “Reform of the U.N. Security Council.”  
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less distinguished predecessor, the Council of the League of 
Nation.18  
The argument continues that the special power of veto to a few countries 
hinders the efficiency and effectiveness of the current institution because many 
influential and globally powerful countries are not represented at the UNSC. 
Additionally, certain important regions such as Africa and Latin America are also 
not represented at the council, which affects the council decisions and their 
implementation.19 The permanent members of the UNSC can use membership 
of the UNSC to advance their security and economic goals.20 Additionally, 
permanent members are globally more relevant than non-members. For 
instance, the United Kingdom, though a smaller country as compared to India, 
possesses more diplomatic weight than India. 
The reform process, especially after 1995, has been viewed as an 
important event within the global forum. Reform tends to mean expansion of the 
UNSC. In 2005, for example, Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs, while giving testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relation 
committee, stated, “Many nations have expressed the view that the Security 
Council, the U.N.’s most powerful body, should be enlarged from its current 
composition…to become more representative of today’s world.”21  
Proponents of reform argue that the council still reflects the power 
structure of World War II; the world mosaic has considerably changed since then, 
they assert, and therefore the current composition of the council must be 
changed or expanded. Trachsler stated, “The current composition of the U.N.’s 
most powerful organ does not represent contemporary geopolitical and geo-
economic realities, but is rather a reflection of the constellation of powers at the 
18 Edward C. Luck, “Principal Organs,” in The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, eds. 
Thomas George Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 659–60.     
19 Swart and Pace, “Changing the Composition,” 2–3. 
20 Jiang, “U.N. Security Council Reform,” 2–3. 
21 “U.S. Views on U.N. Reform, Security Council Expansion.” The American Journal of 
International Law 99, no. 4 (October 2005): 907, available at, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3396686.     
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end of World War II, which diminishes its legitimacy.”22 These proponents 
criticize the undemocratic and non-representative structure of the UNSC, 
including veto power to the P5; they further argue that non-representation of 
certain geographic regions and exclusion of emerging powers—notably India, 
Japan, Germany, and Brazil—has made the council less effective or legitimate.23 
Furthermore, according to McDonald and Patrick, “An unchanged UNSC will 
become increasingly ineffective in addressing today’s security challenges, which 
demand cohesive, broad-based multilateral responses.”24 Supporters of 
enlargement of the UNSC link effectiveness of the council with broader and 
equitable representation. 
Opponents of the reforms, especially of expanding the UNSC, argue that 
“[t]he UNSC is not experiencing a crisis of legitimacy, stating that it remains the 
most effective of all U.N. organs and that the UNSC’s permanent structure still 
reflect the leading political and military power.”25 They argue that expansion of 
the UNSC will slow down the decision-making process even further; if the current 
five permanent members so rarely achieve consensus on crucial issues of peace 
and security, an enlarged council is even less apt to reach decisions.  
Furthermore, opponents of expansion contend that if the veto power is 
undemocratic, it cannot be made democratic by adding more members; rather, 
efforts should be made to reform the voting process and use of veto. In this 
context, Swart and Pace asserted: “If veto rights make the Council dysfunctional 
at times, why increase the number of permanent seats?”26 The current reform 
proposals presented by the G4, Ufc group, African Union, and UHL panel provide 
conflicting and contradictory views, which if implemented will create regional 
22 Trachsler, “U.N. Security Council Reform,” 1. 
23 Vicente, “United Nations Security Council Reform,”19–38. 
24 Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, Security Council Enlargement and U. S. 
Interests (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010), 
http://site.ebrary.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10554825&ppg=1.     
25 Vicente, “United Nations Security Council Reform,” 26. 
26 Swart and Pace, “Changing the Composition, 2. 
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conflicts, disturb regional balance of power, and divide the nations over global 
security challenges rather than unite them. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A large core of literature exists on U.N. reforms, its working procedure, 
decision-making process, expansion of the U.N. Security Council, and use of 
veto power. Sundry panel reports, books, journal articles, and think-tank reports 
range from the history, role, and working procedure of the UNSC to attempts at 
expansion made time to time since the 1960s. However, much less literature 
exists on the implications of current reform proposals on the regional balance 
and peace. Additionally, the criteria established by U.N. High-Level Panel (HLP) 
for the selection of new permanent members are either vague or are not 
evaluated in detail.  
1. Background of UNSC Reform
Soon after the formation of the U.N., the demand to expand the UNSC 
was raised; in 1965, these demands finally materialized, the charter was 
amended, and six new members were added to the nonpermanent category of 
the UNSC.27 Since that time, repeated attempts to expand the UNSC, 
especially in the permanent category, have failed due to rejection by the P5.   
During the Cold War, the UNSC remained mostly paralyzed. However, 
after the Cold War, once again demands for expansion and inclusion of new 
members began to surface, especially in the permanent category. Accordingly, 
since the end of the Cold War, serious efforts have been undertaken to expand 
the UNSC’s permanent and nonpermanent membership. For example, in 1992, 
the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 47/62, “The Question of Equitable 
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council,” 
which called for written comments from member states “on a possible review of 
the membership of the Security Council”—the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), 
27 Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of U.N. Security Council Reform (London: 
Routledge London, 2005), 14.          
 8 
through its Resolution 47/62, decided to include the item in the provisional 
agenda of the forty-eighth session.28 Similarly, in September 2003, U.N. 
Secretary General (UNSG) formed a High-Level Panel (HLP) on “Threats, 
Challenges and Change” to propose the reform of the UNSC.  
In December 2004, the panel submitted its report, “A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility.” The panel suggested two enlargement models: 
Model A and Model B. Both the models recommended enlargement in both the 
permanent and nonpermanent categories; however, Model B introduced a new 
category of semi-permanent membership.29 
The recommendations of HLP on “Threat Challenges and Change” 
triggered swift actions from major countries and regional groups, demanding 
seats for themselves and their regions. Three main groups have emerged in the 
process: the so-called Group of Four (G4), United for Consensus Group (Ufc), 
and the African Union (AU).30 
a. Group of Four (G4) 
Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, known as the G4, have proposed 
expansion of the council in both permanent and nonpermanent categories in a 
draft resolution. In their joint resolution presented in the U.N. General Assembly 
(A/59/L64, July 2005), they collectively recommended the increase of six 
permanent and four  nonpermanent members, thus increasing membership from 
15 to 25.31 They kept the demand for veto power for additional members 
ambiguous.32 The G4 model has recommended four permanent seats for G4 
countries and two seats for African Countries. The G4 argues that it has the will 
                                            
28 U.N. General Assembly, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 47/62, the Question of 
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of Security Council, (August, 1993): 
available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/47/49(Vol.I) .   
29 U.N. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, 2004, http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.        
30 Sarwar, “Expansion of Security Council,” 257–279. 
31 Vicente, “United Nations Security Council Reform,”30. 
32 Ibid. 
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and capacity to play a global leadership role, thus it should be accepted as 
permanent members of the UNSC. 
b. African Union (AU)  
The AU has proposed six permanent, five nonpermanent seats, expanding 
the size of the Council to 26 members.33 Accordingly, the AU has demanded two 
permanent and two additional nonpermanent seats for Africa—the group argues 
that Africa is underrepresented in the current structure of the Council.34 
Furthermore, the AU demands the same power and privileges as that of the 
current P5, including veto power. Interestingly, the AU has not identified its 
potential candidates for permanent seats in the enlarged UNSC.  
c. United for Consensus Group 
In the United for Consensus group (Ufc), prominent countries such as 
Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, Canada, Argentina, and South Korea—mainly regional 
rivals G4 countries—oppose expansion of the UNSC in the permanent category. 
The Ufc argues that permanent membership is discriminatory and unjust, and 
therefore there should be no expansion in the permanent membership of the 
UNSC. The group bases its argument on the equality of all states and opposes 
any discrimination. It contends that enlargement in the permanent category will 
divide the nations rather than unite them. Additionally, the group asserts that the 
argument of geographical representation is invalid because a country may be 
from a particular region, but it does not represent all the countries in that region. 
The group has proposed ten additional nonpermanent members, thus increasing 
the current membership from 15 to 25.35 
                                            
33 Ibid. 
34 African Union, “The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United 
Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus,” Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII), Executive Council, 7th Extraordinary 
Session (2005), 7–8, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/AU_Ezulwini%20Consensus.pdf.         
35 Vicente, “United Nations Security Council Reform,19  
 10 
2. U.N. High Level Panel Enlargement Proposals 
In its report “Threat, Challenges and Change,” The U.N. HLP 
recommended two models of enlargement: Model A and Model B.36 Model A 
calls for the expansion of the UNSC’s permanent and nonpermanent 
membership.37 The panel has recommended an increase of six permanent and 
three nonpermanent members, increasing the membership from the current 15 to 
24.38 Similarly, Model B has suggested an increase of a nonpermanent category 
only.39 This model has recommended an addition of eight nonpermanent 
renewable seats, and one nonpermanent, nonrenewable seat.40 In the case of 
the newly proposed nonpermanent seat, it would have a longer duration of four 
years as compared to the existing two years, and additionally, it would allow 
immediate reelection. It is, however, not clear how many reelections would be 
permitted to a particular country; whether it would be an  unlimited provision of 
reelection or it would have a maximum limit of, say, 10–15 years. 
3. Individual Claims of G4 Countries 
India claims to be the largest democracy in the world. Furthermore, India 
argues that given its large size, population, and troop contribution to U.N. 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), it deserves a larger role on the world stage.41 
The United States, the United Kingdom, and France have supported India for 
permanent membership in the expanded U.N. Security Council, whereas 
Pakistan and China are opposed to India’s membership as a permanent 
member. Pakistan shares border and water disputes with India. According to 
Sarwar, “Apart from other disputes, Kashmir is a major dispute between the two 
                                            
36 U.N. High-level Panel. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Jiang, “U.N. Security Council Reform,” 2. 
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regional rivals and it is on U.N. agenda too.”42 Both countries have fought three 
wars over Kashmir. Pakistan further argues that a permanent seat at the UNSC 
would heavily tilt the balance of power in the region in favor of India. 
Japan is the second-highest financial contributor to the U.N.-assessed 
budget and is among the leading economies of the world. The United States 
supports Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. South Korea and China 
are opposed to Japan’s quest for permanent membership. China and Japan 
share a history of animosity. China accuses Japan for its role in WW II and lack 
of appropriate apology for excesses committed by the Japanese military in China 
and other East Asian countries.43 China also views Japan’s membership at the 
UNSC as a second veto to the United States. 
Germany is the third largest financial contributors to the U.N.-assessed 
budget.44 It has a large economy and has remained quite peaceful since WW II. 
Italy and Spain oppose Germany’s candidacy for a seat at the council.45 Italy 
fears that a permanent seat at the UNSC will enhance Germany’s international 
political and diplomatic power, which would impact the balance of power in the 
European continent. Additionally, Italy argues in favor of a permanent seat for the 
EU and not for the individual country.46 
Brazil is the rising economic and military power of Latin America. 
Currently, there is no seat for Latin America at the Council; therefore, Brazil 
considers itself the right choice. Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia oppose 
Brazil’s move for permanent membership. According to Jian, “They (Argentina, 
Mexico, and Colombia) worry that Brazil’s permanent membership will unduly 
                                            
42 Sarwar, “Expansion,”270–271. 
43 Jiang, “U.N. Security Council Reform,” 2–3. 
44 Bruce Russett, Barry O’Neill, and James Sutterlin, “Breaking the Security Council 
Restructuring Logjam,” Global Governance 2, no. 1 (January–April 1996): 65–80, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/27800128. 
45 Bourantonis, The History and Politics of U.N. Security Council Reform, 48–58. 
46 Hurd, “Myths of Membership,” 200. 
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enhance country’s competiveness in South America and are especially 
suspicious of Brazilian veto.”47  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis adopts an analytical research method in order to examine and 
analyze the reform and expansion process of the UNSC. This thesis analyzes the 
UNSC’s power and responsibilities, reform history, and role in conflict resolution 
in order to ascertain the efficacy of the council and need for expansion and 
reform. This will increase understanding of the relationship between council size, 
composition, and effectiveness. The study focuses on the effects of current 
reform proposals, especially the expansion of the UNSC, on regional peace and 
the balance of power. In order to analyze the impediments to the reform process, 
the viewpoint of regional rivals of the aspirant countries are taken into account.  
The thesis begins with an examination of primary sources such as the 
U.N. documents and secondary sources such as books, journal articles, reports, 
and the official stance and competing proposals of all the stakeholders. 
Moreover, opinions of independent scholars and experts such as Luck, Hurd, 
Sarwar, McDonald, Patrick, and Swart further reinforce the analysis. 
Furthermore, the stances of the P5 states, an important and powerful group of 
states, are also included to ascertain the divisive nature of the reform process.  
E. HYPOTHESES 
I hypothesize that P5 members are in favor of the current structure of the 
Councils, and therefore, no reform that changes the current power structure is 
likely to happen. Although the current structure of the UNSC and veto power is 
viewed as undemocratic, discriminatory, and “anachronistic,”48 it cannot be 
altered due to a difficult procedure to amend the charter—impossible without 
consent of the P5. Recognizing that the present structure of the UNSC does not 
                                            
47 Jiang, “U.N. Security Council Reform,” 2–3. 
48 Kofi Annan, “In Larger Freedom”: Decision Time at the U.N.,” Foreign Affairs (2005): 63–
74, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap5.htm. 
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auger well for the 21st-century democratic values of equality and sovereignty, 
adding more members to the permanent category will not make the council more 
democratic or sovereign. 
Similarly, I also hypothesize that countries selected as permanent 
members of the UNSC represent their respective countries, and not their regions. 
Because permanent members of the UNSC are not selected by the regions, 
these countries owe no favor to regional countries or organizations. Furthermore, 
expansion of the UNSC in the permanent category will benefit only those 
countries that successfully secure a permanent seat at the council. Additionally, 
the selection criteria, such as regional representation, contribution to the U.N.-
assessed budget, and troop contribution to UNPK operations are contradictory, 
and also impeding the reform process of the UNSC. 
I also hypothesize that enlargement of the UNSC in a permanent category 
will affect regional balance, increase power struggles among states, and prevent 
consensus on key security issues. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is composed of six sections. After the Introduction, Chapter II 
covers the history and background of the UNSC, its powers and responsibilities, 
and its role in conflict resolution. Chapter III examines the need for expansion of 
the UNSC, criteria for the selection of new permanent members, and major 
impediments to the reform process. Chapter IV analyzes reform proposals and 
their implications for regional peace and stability. Chapter V covers conclusions 
and the way forward. Finally, a reflections section at the end examines possible 
implications for Pakistan in the event that India becomes a permanent member of 
the UNSC, as well as opportunities for future research. 
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II.  THE UNSC’S ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the most important 
institution of the U.N., which is responsible for maintaining peace in the world.49 
To ensure peace and avoid conflicts among states, the U.N. Charter urges 
member states to resolve disputes through peaceful means.50 In this regard, 
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter states that: 
All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and 
justice, are not endangered…All Members shall refrain… from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.51  
The UNSC prevents illegitimate use of force against member states by 
another member state; however, the UNSC has the legitimate power to use force 
to prevent threats to peace and security in the world.52  
The UNSC’s membership, structured around permanent and 
nonpermanent members, affords a central role to the permanent members in the 
council’s work, and therefore, these permanent members are held responsible for 
the success or failure of the UNSC.53 The nonpermanent members have a 
minimal role in the important debates pertaining to the use of force; therefore 
non-permanent members do not take responsibility for the council’s failure in 
maintaining peace and security. To ensure “equitable geographical 
                                            
49 Vicente, “United Nations Security Council Reform,”21. 
50 Michael J. Matheson, Council Unbound: The Growth of U.N. Decision Making on Conflict 
and Post-conflict Issues After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2006): 15–16. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Temitope Oludoun, “Peace and Security as a Catalyst for the Reform of the U.N. Security 
Council,” Uluslararasi Hukuk Ve Politika 10, no. 39 (2014): 65, 
http://usak.org.tr/images_upload/files/UHP_39_makale3.pdf. 
53 Moore and Pubantz, New United Nations, 78–80. 
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representation,” ten nonpermanent seats of the UNSC are distributed among 
various geographical regions54 of the world.55  
To fulfill its primary responsibility to maintain peace and prevent threats to 
peace, the UNSC has played both positive and negative roles. The council has 
been blamed, on one hand, for overstepping its mandate, and on the other hand, 
for its inaction to prevent human loss and breach of peace.56 For example, the 
council failed to act on the face of large-scale human killings in Rwanda and 
Srebrenica.57 Although, the council has not fully lived up to the vast majority of 
the states in maintaining peace, it has, by and large, played quite an effective 
role in preventing large scale conflicts among states, especially catastrophic 
events like WW II.  
The supporters of the reform process and the expansion of the UNSC 
argue that the present council has failed in its primary responsibility to maintain 
peace in the world, and the failure is attributed to the lack of representative 
character of the council. In order to ascertain the council’s effectiveness, it is 
essential to examine its powers and responsibilities and role in conflict resolution.  
A. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Under Chapter VII, Article 39, the UNSC is primarily responsible for 
“determine[ing] the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken … to maintain or restore international peace and security.”58 To 
                                            
54 Ten nonpermanent seats are distributed on a regional basis: Five from African and Asian 
states, one from Eastern European states, two from Latin American states, and two from Western 
European and other states. 
55 Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, eds., The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
56 Madeleine K. Albright, “United Nations,” Foreign Policy, no. 138 (September–October 
2003): 16–24, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/3183651. 
57 Phil Clark, “Hero, Failure, Or Casualty? A Peacekeeper’s Experience of Genocide,” 
Dissent 52, no. 2 (2005): 115–121, 
https://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/journals/dissent/v052/52.2.clark.html. 
58 Matheson, Council Unbound, 249. 
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fulfill these responsibilities, the UNSC, under Articles 39–45 of the U.N. Charter, 
has been afforded such extraordinary powers as the ability to authorize military 
missions to restore and maintain peace.59 The UNSC also has the power to take 
other punitive actions short of use of force. To coerce the target country to abide 
by the U.N. Charter and UNSC resolutions, the council can impose economic 
sanctions on a member state and can prevent through resolutions all member 
states from doing business or trading with the sanctioned countries.60 For 
instance, the UNSC has imposed economic sanctions on Iran, Congo, 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Angola, Rwanda, and Iraq.61 Furthermore, through 
diplomatic contacts, the UNSC has the power to make recommendations to the 
parties in conflict to reach solution through mediation.62 Additionally, the UNSC is 
the only organ of U.N. that can pass resolutions that are binding for all member 
states.63  
The UNSC has a central role in the amendment of the U.N. Charter. Apart 
from a required two-thirds majority of the member states of the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA), the Charter amendment also requires the consent of 
all P5 members. This implies that even a single permanent member can block a 
proposed amendment to the Charter. The appointment of the United Nations 
Secretary General (UNSG) and admission of new member state also requires a 
two-thirds majority of the UNSC including consent of the P5. Above all, the P5 
has the unique and extraordinary power of the veto; that is, the power to block 
resolutions even when they have been passed by the majority of the member 
states. Additionally, all the non-procedural matters require a yes vote by the veto-
                                            





63 David M. Malone, “Security Council,” in The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 
edited by Weiss, Thomas George and Daws, Sam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007a), 
117–18. 
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holding states—a negative vote by any permanent member blocks passage of 
the proposed resolutions.64  
Apart from the primary responsibilities of maintaining peace and security, 
the UNSC has other responsibilities that empower the council to admit new 
member states and to prevent members found guilty of violations of the U.N. 
Charter from using privileges as a U.N. member. The council may also expel a 
member state that consistently fails to abide by the Charter provisions.65  
B. THE UNSC ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
The role played by the UNSC has gone a long way in authorizing military 
missions to avoid hostilities, prevent recurrences of conflicts, and maintain peace 
and security in the world. Since its formation in 1945, the UNSC has played an 
active and meaningful role in helping to resolve disputes between states, 
managing conflicts, and ending fighting among states. The conflict resolution 
among states has been achieved through a wide range of policy tools such as 
UNSC resolutions demanding cease-fires, negotiated settlements through 
mediation, diplomatic contacts, and deployment of peacekeeping forces and 
observer missions. Since its formation, the UNSC has authorized more than sixty 
missions.66 
The UNSC has a mixed record in resolving the conflicts around the world. 
Various disputes brought before the council have been addressed differently—
and with different results. In some cases, the U.N. has successfully 
accomplished its objectives. For instance, the U.N. played an appreciable role in 
the liberation of Kuwait and independence of East Timor. The U.N. also helped 
East Timor with institution building and security sectors after its independence in 
                                            
64 Edward C. Luck, U.N. Security Council: Practice and Promise (London: Routledge, 2006): 
7–9. http://www.tandfebooks.com.libproxy.nps.edu/isbn/9780203969335.  
65 Matheson, Council Unbound, 18–20. 
66 David M. Malone, “Security Council,” in the Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, eds. 
Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007b), 119–121. 
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2002.67 In many cases, the U.N. has succeeded partially in achieving its 
objectives. However, some of the conflicts and disputes brought before the 
council are still pending for just disposal, for example, Kashmir and the Middle 
East disputes.68 
Unfortunately, in many cases, the UNSC has failed to fulfill the 
expectations of its framers and the global community. For instance, the UNSC 
has failed to play a meaningful and active role during the Iraq–Iran War in the 
eighties. Additionally, the UNSC also failed to prevent the United States and its 
allies from attacking Iraq in violation of the U.N. Charter. Likewise, the UNSC 
also failed to maintain peace in Somalia, Bosnia, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC).69 The failure has been attributed to the composition and structure 
of the UNSC. 
For the most part the UNSC has remained paralyzed in the security field, 
which is attributed to its composition, structure, and working method. The inability 
of the UNSC to fulfill its responsibilities toward maintenance of peace is a direct 
result of the power tussle among global powers—the UNSC remained paralyzed 
during the Cold War due to competition for power between Russia and the United 
States.70 Similarly, during the second Gulf War, the P5 failed to agree on the 
authorization of use of force against Iraq.71 The following sections analyze the 
role of the UNSC in resolving some of the key disputes in the world. 
                                            
67 Ludovic Hood, “Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999–2004,” International 
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1. East Timor 
East Timor was a former Portuguese colony that remained under 
occupation of the Indonesian military for more than two decades.72 Since 1960, 
the U.N. has recognized the special status of East Timor and remained 
committed to finding the solution of the issue. According to Martin and Mayer-
Rieckh, “From 1975 to 1981 the General Assembly passed annual resolutions 
reaffirming the inalienable right of the East Timorese to self-determination and 
expressing concern at the suffering—which was indeed extreme—of the civilian 
population.”73 After significant U.N. efforts, East Timor became an independent 
country in May 2002 and was admitted as a U.N. member state in September 
2002.74 The people of East Timor gave huge sacrifices to achieve freedom. A 
large number of people died during their struggle for independence, and many of 
them became Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).75 As a result of the mediation 
among the U.N. and as well as the Indonesian and Portuguese governments, the 
people of East Timor—at that time under Indonesian military occupation—were 
afforded the right to determine whether they wanted autonomy or 
independence.76 This agreement was authorized through the UNSC Resolution 
1246, which was passed on June 11, 1999.77  
Subsequent to the agreement of May 5, 1999, the UNSC tasked the U.N. 
mission in East Timor to organize a plebiscite. The U.N. police, assisted by the 
Indonesian police, organized the voting process. On August 30, 1999 an 
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overwhelming majority—78.5%—of adult East Timorese voted in favor of 
independence.78  
U.N. Role: following the vote for independence, the UNSC established the 
United Nations Transition Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) through 
unanimous adoption of Resolution 1272 (1999) on October 25 with the mandate 
of administering East Timor.79 The mission comprised governance and public 
administration components, including 1,640 police officers, a “humanitarian 
assistance and emergency rehabilitation component;” and a military component 
of up to 8,950 peacekeeping troops (PKF) and 200 military observers.80 The 
UNTAET registered voters, organized elections, and assisted the new 
governments in administering the country.81 Additionally, soon after 
independence, when pro-Indonesian militias resorted to violence, the UNSC-
mandated the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), under Australia, 
and quickly deployed the force to prevent violence and protect the property and 
lives of the East Timorese.82  
The U.N. displayed an unprecedented amount of resolve and commitment 
in the solution of the East Timor problem. The council extensively remained 
involved in all phases of East Timor problems—security, administration, and 
institution building. Throughout its history, the UNSC’s handling of the East Timor 
problem has been considered as a test case and exemplary for all future 
handling of conflicts by the council.83 
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2. Iraq War of 1991 
On August 2, 1990, Iraq, due to economic and border disputes, invaded 
and annexed Kuwait, which confronted the world with an international crisis and 
threat to global peace and security. Under the U.N. Charter, the act of President 
Saddam Hussein amounted to an open aggression against a U.N. member state. 
The UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 660 immediately after the invasion, 
and demanded unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.84 Unlike 
during the Cold War, both world powers cooperated in taking strict action against 
Iraq for its unprovoked aggression against Kuwait.85 This unprecedented unity 
established UNSC prestige and power and restored its effectiveness that was 
lost during the Cold War. The Iraqi president failed to comply with the UNSC 
resolution. As a result, the world coalition led by the United States attacked Iraq 
and liberated Kuwait.  
The Iraq invasion of Kuwait followed the Iran-Iraq War that ended in a 
stalemate between two Muslim neighbors. Both countries fought unsuccessfully 
for more than eight years.86 The UNSC made a timely decision about the matter 
and effectively led the successful operation for the liberation of Kuwait.  
U.N. Role: The UNSC response in resolving the Kuwait crisis was one of 
the most successful actions of the UNSC since its inception in 1945. This action 
restored the confidence of the member states, especially the world’s developing 
countries, on the U.N. The prompt and effective actions by the U.N. reasserted 
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the proactive role of the U.N. in the post-Cold War era.87 It was the most 
effective of all the U.N.-mandated military operations in which a sovereign 
member state was defended against aggression by another U.N. member state. 
Although the U.N. role was appreciated by the member states, the 
unanimity of the P5 was a result of a proactive role of the United States and not 
the U.N. In this context, while addressing the Congress, President George Bush 
reaffirmed the future predominant global role of the United States and stated that, 
“We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian 
Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic 
period of cooperation.”88 The proactive and prompt action of the UNSC restored 
its power and credibility that was shattered during the Cold War. 
3. Iraq War of 2003 
The United States and the UK, along with the minor assistance of a 
coalition of small countries, invaded Iraq in March 2003.89 Within a month, Iraqi 
forces were defeated and the coalition forces occupied Iraq. The invasion was 
launched without the legal authorization of the UNSC. The United States 
intended to get a fresh resolution passed by the UNSC before going to war with 
Iraq; however, fearing veto by France and opposition by such major countries as 
Germany and Russia, the United States invaded and occupied Iraq, bypassing 
the U.N. and disregarding the U.N. Charter.90  
Use of force by the member state without legitimate authorization of the 
UNSC constitutes a clear violation of the U.N. Charter. The Charter prevents 
member states from using force or threat of use of force against other member 
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states.91 According to Matheson, “All Members shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security, and justice, are not endangered.”92 The threat or use of force can be 
used either in case of self-defense or when authorized by the UNSC. 
The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was accused of possessing 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Saddam denied the charge but failed to 
satisfy the U.N. weapon inspectors, which further raised suspicion about WMD.  
U.N. Role: On November 8, 2002, the UNSC passed Resolution 1441 and 
demanded that the Iraqi government provide accurate information on its WMD 
program.93 Following the failure of the Iraqi government to comply with the 
recommendations of Resolution 144, the veto-holding countries could not agree 
on the use of force against Iraq.94  
While the UNSC remained paralyzed during the Cold War, the unilateral 
action of the United States introduced a new trend in the global relations—
disregard for the U.N. Charter and the international system that had existed for 
over six decades. The U.N. failed to stop the United States from invading a 
sovereign member state that undermined the authority of the UNSC. 
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4. Kashmir Dispute 
The genesis of the Kashmir dispute95 lies in the partition plan of the sub-
continent.96 Since the independence of India and Pakistan, Kashmir has been 
one of the world’s most enduring and violent conflicts. The dispute over Kashmir 
is also one of the first brought to the U.N. for settlement.  
Both Pakistan and India have conflicting opinions on Kashmir.97 Except 
for the first few years following independence, Indian leaders maintain that 
Kashmir is an integral part of India, and the ruler of Kashmir legally acceded the 
state to India. They further argue that the map of South Asia cannot be redrawn; 
Indian leaders fear that another division on the basis of religion will have a 
domino effect on ethnically divided India. On August 15, 2002, while addressing 
the nation on Independence Day, the former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee reiterated, “We wish to state once again that Jammu and Kashmir is an 
integral part of India. It will remain so … For us, Kashmir is not a piece of land; it 
is a test case of Sarva Dharma Samabhava—secularism. India has always stood 
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the test of a secular nation. Jammu and Kashmir is a living example of it.”98 This 
claim of India’s is not in line with the UNSC resolutions that consider Kashmir as 
a disputed territory between Indian and Pakistan of which the final status has to 
be ascertained through plebiscite.  
Pakistan maintains that Kashmir is part of the unfinished agenda of the 
1947 partition plan. Pakistan does not accept Kashmir as part of India; rather it 
considers Kashmir as a disputed territory. According to Pervez Musharraf, former 
President of Pakistan, “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to 
sever links with Kashmir. The entire Pakistan and the world know this. We will 
continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We 
will never budge an inch from our principled stand on Kashmir.”99 The Pakistani 
leaders argue that the fate of the dispute should be settled in accordance with 
the UNSC resolutions. The UNSC resolution proposed that future of Kashmir 
whether to join India or Pakistan be determined through free and fair 
plebiscite.100 
The U.N. Role: Over the years, the UNSC has passed a number of 
resolutions to settle the enduring conflict between India and Pakistan. For 
example, in January 1948, the UNSC passed a resolution and established the 
U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to inquire of the matter and 
conduct mediation.101 In January 1949, the UNSC established the United 
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to monitor 
violations at the cease-fire line (CFL), known presently as the Line of Control 
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(LOC).102 Furthermore, the UNSC Resolution 47, adopted in April 1948, called 
upon India and Pakistan to end fighting and introduced for the first time a 
roadmap for the solution of the Kashmir dispute. The UNSC accepted the 
disputed nature of Kashmir and expressed its resolve in these words: “Noting 
with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the 
accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through 
the democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite.”103 However, the U.N. 
failed to put forward a referendum, thus diminishing the council’s authority and 
credibility.   
At the beginning of the dispute, the UNSC played an active role and 
passed resolutions that provided a roadmap for the solution of the Kashmir 
dispute. Over time, the UNSC’s role has remained mediatory without any effort to 
impose authority. Although the UNSC failed to implement its decisions, the 
existence of the UNMOGIP under the UNSC’s auspices has kept the dispute 
alive. 
5. Rwandan Genocide 
In 1994, more than one million people were killed in one of the worst acts 
of human suffering in the modern history. The killing operation continued for 
three months, April to July 1994.104  The large-scale killings of minority Tutsi tribe 
by majority Hutu were an act of well-planned operation of the government of 
Rwanda.105 Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the U.N. 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), battled unsuccessfully with the staff of 
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superior bureaucracy in U.N. HQ New York, to allow him to employ the U.N. 
Force available to him to prevent the genocide.106  
To highlight the internal weaknesses of the U.N. staff and Secretariat, the 
U.N.-mandated inquiry commission termed the Rwandan Genocide “one of the 
most abhorrent events of the twentieth century,” and according to Linda Melvern, 
“The report [Carlsson Report] leaves no doubt that each part of the U.N. system, 
and particular the secretary-general, the Secretariat, the Security Council, and 
the member states, must assume and acknowledge their responsibility in the 
failure.”107 Furthermore, France and Belgium criticized Dallaire and accused 
him of overstepping his mandate of maintaining peace rather than protecting 
civilians.108 Additionally, in the face of worst genocide, Belgium withdrew their 
paratroopers—the most effective troops of UNAMIR—from Rwanda.109 The 
abrupt and unplanned withdrawal of the paratroopers by the Belgian government 
prevented the chance, if any, of averting the mass killings of Tutsis. 
The senior staff at U.N. HQ New York did not pay serious attention to 
preventing mass killings of the Tutsis. It is not clear whether the U.N. staff 
deliberately avoided involvement in the conflict and protecting civilians or if they 
failed to comprehend the scale of killings. However, a timely action from U.N. HQ 
New York might have saved many innocent Rwandans. According to Clark, 
“Dellaire sent a now-famous telegram to U.N. Headquarters in New York, where 
Kofi Anan was head of Peacekeeping Operations, warning that mass violence 
was imminent and calling for a bolstering of UNAMIR’s troop force and mandate 
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in order to protect civilian.”110 Kofi Anan and staff at the U.N. set aside Dellaire’s 
requests for additional troops and instead urged him to “stay within the limits of 
the original mandate.”111 Remaining with the original mandate meant non-
interference in the mass killings of Tutsis. 
U.N. Role: The U.N. failed to prevent millions of innocent Tutsi lives taken 
from Hutus, although authorities at U.N. Headquarters were informed well in 
advance.112 The countries of the P5 did not show any serious effort for timely 
intervention because Rwanda had no strategic significance to most of them.113 
Additionally, General Romeo Dellaire identified the villainous role of the various 
actors involved in the genocide directly or indirectly. According to him, Hutus are 
the main ones who planned and executed the genocide of the Tutsis.114 
General Dellaire has also put the blame on France and the United States 
because, according to Clark, “Both governments used their position on the U.N. 
Security Council to lobby for either the curtailing or complete abandonment of 
UNAMIR.”115 The French played a negative role and to an extent helped the 
regime that planned and conducted the killings.116 Murigande described the 
UNSC’s role during the crisis in these words: 
Two months later, in what appeared to be the ultimate act of 
international cynicism, the Security Council authorized France, the 
lead sponsor of the regime that committed the genocide, to send a 
“protection force” to Rwanda. The force succeeded in only one 
thing: allowing the genocide killers safe passage to flee to 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where, even today, 
thirteen years later, they continue to wreck havoc in eastern DRC 
and to threaten the security of Rwanda and the rest of the region, 
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despite the massive and costly presence of troops of the U.N. 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.117  
Additionally, the UNSC’s mandated “Operation Turquoise” led by France 
did not play any meaningful role to identify and apprehend those responsible for 
the mass killings of Tutsis.118  
The U.N. failed to prevent the mass killings of Tutsis despite clear and 
advance warning from the Force Commander Lieutenant General Romeo 
Dellaire. For instance, instead of strengthening UMAMIR to protect the genocide, 
the UNSC passed Resolution 912 in April 1994 that reduced its existing troop 
level from 2,500 to 270, which further diminished any chance of protecting the 
extermination of Tutsis.119 This U.N. failure has highlighted its procedural 
weaknesses as well as the indifference of the P5. Had the U.N. staff realized the 
seriousness and urgency of the situation and the P5 had authorized UNAMIR to 
launch a preemptive attack to seize weapons caches, which were procured for 
use against Tutsis, the catastrophes could have been averted. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The UNSC has played an effective role in some of the important conflicts 
in the world. However, it has also failed in some of the key areas of security 
including the protection of innocent human beings against mass killings. While 
the UNSC played a central role in the first Gulf War, which resulted in the defeat 
of Iraqi forces and the liberation of Kuwait, it failed miserably to implement its 
resolution on the Kashmir dispute. The second Gulf War undermined U.N. 
authority and prestige and made it irrelevant in the eyes of many member states. 
The United States and its allies attacked Iraq, a sovereign member state, without 
legal authorization from the U.N..120 The unilateral action by the United States 
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and its allies violated the U.N. Charter; however, the U.N. could not protect its 
authority and failed to take action for violation of the U.N. Charter. 
Additionally, during the Cold War—1950 to 1987—the U.N., for all 
practical purposes, remained paralyzed due to a power struggle between two 
world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. For instance, during the 
Cold War period between 1946 and 1987, the UNSC passed over 500 
resolutions, whereas between 1987 and 2005, half the length of the Cold War, 
over 1,000 resolutions were passed.121 This shows an inactive role of the UNSC 
during the Cold War period, yet a more revitalized function in the post–Cold War 
era.122 Similarly, the use of vetoes was also reduced significantly—in the Cold 
War period, the veto was used 212 times whereas in the post–Cold War period, 
just over 50 resolutions were vetoed.123 However, the post–Cold War period saw 
an increased role of the UNSC, but only in those areas that had significant 
strategic concerns for the P5. Since 1990, there has been a significant reduction 
in the interstate armed conflicts in the world. 
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III. NEED FOR EXPANSION OF THE UNSC 
Every organization and institution periodically must reform or reorganize to 
meet the changing nature of its responsibilities. The UNSC, an important 
international organization, is no exception. Indeed, according to Luck, “Through 
the years, scores of independent commissions… have put forward literally 
hundreds of proposals aimed at making the world body work better, decide more 
fairly, modify its mandate, or operate more efficiently.”124 Expanding the 
permanent membership of the UNSC has prominently figured among these 
proposals. 
The efforts toward such reform started soon after the creation of the 
U.N..125 Even at the time of creation, disputes surfaced over the composition, 
structure, and powers of the UNSC—over the difference between powers and 
privileges of the permanent and nonpermanent members. For instance, in 
October 1947, the U.S. Senate expenditures committee highlighted serious 
weaknesses in the coordination, administration, and financial mismanagement of 
the U.N. Likewise, the representatives of many states, present at the time of 
formation of the U.N., viewed permanent membership as undemocratic and 
discriminatory.126 According to Pakistani Ambassador Kamal Khan, “[T]he veto 
power is considered by many as anachronistic and undemocratic, [and] that does 
not augur well with democratic values of twenty-first century.”127  
Some delegates at the formation conference of new international system 
called for holding a review conference within a year to add more permanent 
members to the UNSC, especially from Latin America.128 According to Weiss, 
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At the San Francisco conference where the U.N. Charter was 
drafted, delegates who were dissatisfied with a revival of kind of 
nineteenth-century Concert of Europe—with more powerful states 
given special roles—but also did not wish to impede the effective 
creation of the new world body expected that a review conference 
for all U.N. member states would be convened relatively quickly to 
discuss changes in the Charter and organizational structures.129 
These delegates intended to keep the provision for Charter amendment 
flexible and easy. However, the P5 rejected these demands and made the 
Charter amendments difficult and linked any change to the Charter to the 
consensus of the permanent members.130 For these difficult provisions, the 
Charter has been amended only once since its adoption, in 1945. 
Within the present context of liberal democratization, the concept of 
permanency combined with veto power does not fit into the current idea of 
equality among states. Additionally, the rise of new countries and decline of 
some of the current P5 have further intensified the debate to reform and expand 
the UNSC. Four key points militate for expansion of the UNSC: regional 
representation, size of the council vis-à-vis overall membership of the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), inequality among members of the UNSC, 
and accommodation of those states in the decision-making process at the UNSC 
that contribute more to the U.N. financially and militarily.131 For all of these 
reasons, there is a wider consensus among all the member countries about 
reform, and more particularly the expansion of the UNSC.132 This unity breaks 
down almost immediately over the question of just how to affect the expansion. 
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A. REGIONAL REPRESENTATION 
The current UNSC membership represents the global power structure of 
the post-WW II period and is skewed heavily in favor of the industrialized north. 
At the time of the U.N.’s formation, Africa, Latin America, and Asia were only 
marginally represented at the conference that created the new international 
system—for instance, only three countries represented Africa and the same 
number of states represented Asia. None was represented at the Council.  
Within decades of the establishment of the U.N., the U.N. membership, 
especially from Africa and Asia, grew rapidly, mostly due to decolonization.133 
Decolonization is a post-war phenomenon. Hence, most of the emerging 
independent states in Asia and Africa were not part of the power-sharing formula 
at the international level that was concluded in 1945 at San Francisco.134 The 
absence of member states from key regions of the world created a sense of 
deprivation and injustice among the leaders of these regions.  
The idea of equitable representation among various regions at the UNSC 
has taken center stage in the reform process of the world body.135 Distribution of 
permanent seats among all regions is a key factor that has driven the reform and 
expansion process of the UNSC. For example, the leaders from Africa demand 
representation at the decision-making forum because the continent is not 
represented at the council in the permanent category.136 Additionally, the African 
continent has more often remained the subject of the UNSC resolutions 
pertaining to the use of force and deployment of military missions for 
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maintenance of peace and security.137 The African continent comprises 54 
countries but is not represented at the council, which makes the council’s 
authority and legitimacy questionable. If these regions are excluded from the 
decision-making process, their lack of cooperation in implementing the UNSC 
resolutions pertaining to their region would impede the achievement of desired 
objectives. Therefore, these countries strongly argue that the African continent 
be given meaningful representation in the expanded UNSC in both permanent 
and  nonpermanent categories.  
B. SIZE OF THE COUNCIL VIS-À-VIS OVERALL MEMBERSHIP OF THE 
UNGA 
The increase in U.N. membership has exacerbated the disproportionate 
representation at the UNSC. Since the formation of the U.N. in 1945, its overall 
membership has expanded substantially, but the UNSC has, except for increase 
in the nonpermanent category in 1965, remained unchanged. From 50 member 
states in 1945, the U.N. membership has expanded to 193 states.138 At the time 
of formation of the UNSC, the ratio of one UNSC seat was equal to 10 members 
of the U.N., whereas today one UNSC seat is equal to more than 40 members of 
the UNGA. This imbalance has provoked the U.N. member countries to demand 
reformation and expansion of the UNSC both in permanent and nonpermanent 
categories.  
Supporters of UNSC reform and expansion argue that the small size of the 
UNSC in comparison to the overall membership of the UNSC has undermined 
the council’s authority and legitimacy. For one thing, the UNSC is dependent on 
the support of the U.N. member states, especially the powerful middle-tier 
countries, for implementation of its resolutions and decisions. For another, the 
U.N. is not a parallel government at the international level. In other words, the 
UNSC has as much power as the member states, especially the powerful 
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regional and global economic and military powers afforded to the council. The 
rising powers that hold huge political, economic and military influence within and 
outside their regions, if included in the decision-making process at the UNSC, 
would significantly contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the 
world.139  
Proponents of reform, such as the G4 and the AU, argue that the small 
size of the UNSC has negatively affected the efficiency, authority, and legitimacy 
of the council as a whole. They maintain that the council’s decisions lack broader 
support due to the absence of the current regional and world powers, which 
substantially contribute to the U.N., economically and militarily.140 If these 
countries are not included in the executive body then they may reduce or block 
funding to the council, which will negatively impact the functioning of the world 
body. 
C. INEQUALITY AMONG MEMBERS OF THE UNSC 
The powers and privileges of the permanent and nonpermanent members 
are major inadequacies that raise the demand for change at the UNSC. The 
members states that were either unhappy with the global power structure or were 
not present at the time of formation of the international organization demand to 
seek a useful role for their countries.141 Meanwhile, the aspirant states recognize 
that the current power structure, though unequal and against the sovereign 
equality of the members states, cannot be undone. These countries, as an 
alternate, demand expansion of the council, instead of abolition of the veto 
power. 
Similarly, the inequality among permanent and nonpermanent members is 
huge. Due to this difference, the rising powers that are not represented as 
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permanent members feel frustrated and demand reforms and seek wider roles in 
the decision-making process at the global stage. According to Luck, 
The diversity of the United Nations’ membership and ambitious 
nature of its mandates make it highly likely that some 
constituencies will be seriously disappointed with its power-sharing 
arrangements and/or its accomplishment at any point in time. 
Persistent disappointment or feelings of disenfranchisement have 
often led to calls for reform.142 
Apart from veto power, there is a marked difference between the power 
and privileges of the permanent and nonpermanent members. The veto-holding 
countries not only enjoy powers with regards to Charter amendment and 
appointment of the UNSG, but they also possess significant influence due to their 
permanent presence at the U.N. HQ—unlike nonpermanent members that rotate 
after every two years. By the time nonpermanent members acquaint themselves 
with the work procedure of the council, their two-year term is complete. 
Furthermore, the permanent members each maintain a huge bureaucracy and 
staff, which the nonpermanent members cannot match.143 According to Caron, 
“The staffing capability of the permanent members within the Council allows them 
disproportionately to influence the outcome of its proceedings.”144 Because the 
nonpermanent members remain on the council for a brief period, these countries 
do not maintain a large staff and matching diplomatic weight. This inherent 
disadvantage of nonpermanent members allows the P5 to significantly influence 
the outcome of council’s decisions. 
D. COUNTRIES THAT CONTRIBUTE MORE SHOULD BE REPRESENTED 
AT THE UNSC 
The supporters of the reforms process maintain that those countries that 
contribute more financially and militarily should be represented at the UNSC and 
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that these countries should be given an enhanced role in the decision-making 
process at the global level. For example, after the United States, Germany and 
Japan are the largest financial contributors to the U.N.-assessed budget.145 
Despite their huge financial contributions, these countries are not represented at 
the Council and are thus excluded from its decision-making process. The 
proponents of the UNSC’s expansion argue that the emerging powers that 
significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security 
should be included in the decision-making process at the UNSC.146 Recognizing 
the contribution of member states, the HLP states that 
Those [countries] who contribute most to the United Nations 
financially, militarily and diplomatically—specifically in terms of 
contributions to the United Nations assessed budget, participation 
in mandated peace operations, contributions to the voluntary 
activities of the United Nations…and diplomatic activities in support 
of United Nations objectives and mandates.147 
Furthermore, other countries that have huge population and military 
capability and contribute to maintenance of global peace are also not 
represented at the Council. For instance, India is the second-largest state in 
terms of population and also one of the top troop contributors to the U.N. 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). If India is not represented at the council then it 
might reconsider its support for the UNPKO, which would negatively affect the 
U.N.’s efforts to maintain peace in the world. Similarly, there is a relative decline 
in the powers of the P5 countries, notably France, Russia, and the UK. This 
relative decline and rise of the other states has raised the demand for expansion 
of the UNSC to accommodate rising regional military and economic powers.  
Many argue that an increase in the UNSC membership would enhance its 
authority and legitimacy as its decisions would be supported by the countries that 
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have large population, influence, and capacity to implement the council’s 
decisions.148 And similarly, their exclusion would erode the UNSC’s legitimacy, 
effectiveness, and efficiency. 
The effectiveness of the UNSC depends on two aspects: first, the 
decision-making process of the UNSC, and second, the implementation of the 
UNSC’s decisions by the member states. The effectiveness of the decision-
making process can be best achieved through a small executive body, composed 
of fewer members that take quick decisions to deal with the situation that 
warrants immediate response to effectively maintain international peace and 
security.149 However, these decisions will be meaningless if not implemented by 
the member states that are not represented at the council. Members that have no 
stake in the implementation of the UNSC’s decision will tend to resist their 
implementation. This lack of cooperation by the member states will make the 
council less effective and less legitimate. 
The increase in the membership of the UNSC will enhance its legitimacy. 
According to Hurd, “An increase in the permanent membership would strengthen 
the U.N. and increase its legitimacy through bringing the organization closer to 
present-day global realities.”150 The legitimacy and enhanced ownership of its 
decisions by the member states would make the council more effective.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The proponents of the reforms argue that an unchanged UNSC will lose 
its efficacy, effectiveness, and legitimacy. The stagnant structure and 
composition of the UNSC affects its ability to prevent conflicts and maintain 
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peace and security in the world.151 For the UNSC to be an effective, vibrant, and 
legitimate organization, its decisions needs to be supported by the majority of the 
member states. Theoretically, the UNSC draws its legitimacy from the Charter; 
however, lack of support from the majority of countries in the council’s 
composition, working procedure, and structure makes the council less legitimate 
and effective. McDonald and Patrick argued, “A more compelling reason to 
support UNSC enlargement, however, is concern that an unchanged UNSC will 
become increasingly ineffective in addressing today’s security challenges, which 
demand cohesive, broad-based multilateral responses.”152 Although the council’s 
decisions, according to the U.N. Charter, are binding on all member states, the 
rising powers may not support implementation of the UNSC’s decisions—if these 
decisions are not of an immediate strategic interest to these countries. 
The exclusion of rising regional and global power might make the council 
less effective and illegitimate. For example, Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India 
have the economic strength, military capabilities, and will to contribute in large 
measures toward peace and security in the world. These rising powers, if not 
included in the decision-making process at the world stage, might hinder the 
implementation of the UNSC resolutions, which would affect the UNSC’s 
efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally, the rising powers tend to find rightful 
place for themselves and denial of the same might pose challenge to the 
international system. In this context McDonald and Patrick argue that, 
“Historically, the task of accommodating rising powers has been among the most 
difficult challenges of world politics.153  
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IV. CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS: ANALYSIS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
Since the publication of the HLP report, major stakeholders in the reform 
of the UNSC began to solicit support from other member states. The G4 and AU 
countries are trying to muster a two-thirds majority at the UNGA to, as a first 
step, pass a resolution in favor of the charter amendment and the UNSC 
reforms.154 Conversely, Ufc member states are trying to convince likeminded 
countries to block passage of such a resolution. Additionally, the P5 states are 
divided over their support to various aspirant countries; however, the P5 
unanimously opposes extension of veto power to new permanent members.155 
The G4, AU, and Ufc member states are fighting for their national interests 
in a struggle for global power and influence.156 The G4 and AU members support 
expansion of the UNSC’s permanent category and demand seats for 
themselves.157 In contrast, the Ufc members oppose expansion of the UNSC’s 
permanent category, are not competing for permanent seats at the UNSC, but 
want to deny permanent seats to their rivals to remain relevant within the 
international power politics.158 The HLP panel, however, has offered two options 
without stating any preference for either model.159  
The HLP, G4, and AU enlargement proposals have not only blocked the 
reform process but have also posed a serious challenge to the unity among 
member states and have affected balance at the UNSC. The conflicts of interest 
between aspirant countries and their regional rivals have divided the member 
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states in various groups, causing competition against each other. I therefore 
argue that the current enlargement proposals of the UNSC to increase the 
UNSC’s membership in the permanent category would pose a serious challenge 
to cooperation among member states at the regional and global level. The lack of 
cooperation would affect regional peace and negatively affect the UNSC efforts 
towards maintenance of peace. Additionally, enlargement proposals, seeking 
expansion of the UNSC’s permanent category, would disturb regional balance at 
the UNSC. This chapter analyzes the enlargement proposals of the HLP, the G4, 
the AU, and the Ufc countries to ascertain the regional and global implications of 
these proposals.  
A. HLP REFORM PROPOSALS 
The HLP proposals have certain flaws that have divided the countries at 
the regional and global level. Despite clear selection criteria, the panel has not 
identified or recommended possible candidate states for permanent 
membership.160 The distribution of seats among geographical regions indicates 
the likely candidates. For example, the panel has proposed two permanent seats 
each for Africa and Asia. South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt could be the likely 
candidates from Africa; Japan and India are the only candidates from Asia. 
Likewise, one permanent seat each has been recommended for Latin America 
and Europe. Brazil and Germany are the potential aspirants to these seats, 
respectively. Still, with no clear guidance from the HLP, powerful and influential 
countries have begun to lobby.  
The HLP proposals neither address the current imbalance between 
developed and developing countries nor the equitable representation of various 
geographical regions. For instance, if Model A (the UNSC’s expansion to 24 
members, six permanent without veto power and four nonpermanent) is 
approved, Europe, with 48 countries, would have a new total of four permanent 
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members; whereas Africa, with 54 member states, would have only two 
permanent seats.161 In Model A’s scenario, the existing imbalance among 
various regions would be further widened. Additionally, Asia’s permanent 
representation will be increased from one, at present, to a total of three 
members.162 Furthermore, the addition of Germany and Japan would further tilt 
the balance in favor of the industrialized north, which is already 
overrepresented.163 
Model B (enlargement of the UNSC to 24 members and addition of eight 
semi-permanent and one non-permanent seat) of the HLP, however, provides a 
balanced enlargement mechanism that is likely to be acceptable to all P5 and Ufc 
group countries. However, the AU and the G4 countries are unhappy with this 
model because G4 and AU countries demand expansion of permanent 
membership.164 The newly introduced semi-permanent seats, if accepted, would 
satisfy such aspirant countries as India, Germany, Brazil, Japan, and the AU, 
which demand enhanced roles at the Council; at the same time, such second-tier 
countries as Italy, Canada, Pakistan, Argentina, South Korea, and Spain would 
also have the chance to be elected for long-term seats. 
HLP has not provided a clear framework with one preferred model for 
reform, which has divided the global community in unending competition between 
aspirants and rivals.165 Significantly, neither panel has recommended extension 
of veto power to new permanent members.166 The denial of veto right to new 
permanent members has left the issue of inequality among UNSC members 
unsettled—a key demand of the supporters of the UNSC’s expansion. Table 1 
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(Model A) and Table 2 (Model B) detail the similarities and differences between 
permanent and proposed permanent, nonpermanent, and semi-permanent seats. 
In Model A, the HLP proposed six permanent seats: two permanent seats each 
for Asia and Africa, and one permanent seat each for Europe and Americas.  
In Model B (Table 2), the panel has not proposed any new permanent 
members, and has instead presented a new category of semi-permanent 
membership (four-year renewable seat). In this model, the panel has proposed 
eight semi-permanent seats to be elected on a regional basis, and one 
nonpermanent seat. The eight semi-permanent seats have been equally 
distributed among four geographical regions.  

















Africa 54 0 2 4 6 
Asia 56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 48 3 1 2 6 
Americas 35 1 1 4 6 
Total 193 5 6 13 24 
 
Source: U.N., A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York, U.N., 
2004). http:www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf. 
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Africa 54 0 2 4 6 
Asia and 
Pacific 
56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 48 3 2 1 6 
Americas 35 1 2 3 6 
Total 193 5 8 11 24 
Source: U.N., A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York, U.N., 
2004). http:www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf. 
In both models, the panel has proposed six seats each for four 
geographical regions. However, there is a difference between permanent and 
nonpermanent seats allocated to each of the previously mentioned regions. For 
example, in the case of Model A, Africa would have two permanent and four 
nonpermanent seats, whereas Europe would have four permanent and two 
nonpermanent seats. The existing imbalance in the form of permanent 
membership would further widen between various regions because only the 
permanent membership is viewed as an actual source of power and not the 
nonpermanent membership. In case of Model B, rather than balancing the 
current imbalance, the newly introduced eight semi-permanent seats have been 
equally distributed among four geographical regions. For example, Europe, which 
is already overrepresented, has also been awarded two semi-permanent seats. 
B. THE G4 MODEL: COLLECTIVE CLAIM FOR A UNSC SEAT 
G4 countries are collectively striving to secure permanent seats for their 
group at the UNSC. The G4 model proposes enlarging the UNSC to 25 
members.167 In addition to permanent seats for their own group, the G4 model 
has also proposed two permanent seats for Africa.168 The G4 model replicates 
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Model A of the HLP. Initially, G4 countries demanded permanent seats with veto 
power; however, realizing the enormity of the challenge and resistance by the 
P5, the G4 countries reviewed their claim and dropped the demand for veto.169 
The willingness of the G4 to forgo veto right was aimed at securing support of the 
P5 member states.  
Many countries and groups have come together to oppose the G4 in 
blocking expansion of the UNSC in permanent category. For example, Canada, 
which otherwise maintains cordial relation with the G4 countries, but as a 
member of the Ufc, is opposed to expansion of the UNSC’s permanent 
membership. Canada maintains that extension of permanent membership would 
benefit only the aspirant countries and not the broad U.N. membership.170 
Additionally, Canada, an important country from Americas, is not being 
considered for permanent membership in the expanded council. Canada views 
the permanent category’s expansion undemocratic. While reiterating his country 
stance on the expansion of the UNSC, Canadian permanent representative at 
the U.N., Mr. Allan Rock, stated: 
The permanent members of the present Council took their seats in 
a distant and very different age. The forces that shaped the post–
war creation of the United Nations were unique at that 
time…Canada believes…that the accession of additional 
permanent to the Security Council would not be in the best interests 
of this institution, and would not be in the long–term best interests 
of the overwhelming majority of its member states…it would deny a 
fair and a flexible allocation of seats…It would deprive the world’s 
region of a democratic…way to determine for themselves their 
representative on this institution’s most significant body. Mr. 
President, supporters of the resolution have suggested that the 
process they propose is democratic…I know of no democracy in 
which single election is sufficient to entitle the winner to remain in 
office in perpetuity…The addition of permanent members would 
have significant and adverse indirect consequences through what is 
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known as “the cascade effects”…Canada will vote against the 
pending resolution…in the interest of this institution.171 
Additionally, South Korea—a member of the Ufc group—and Japan—part 
of the G4 states—important East Asian countries, are divided over permanent 
expansion of the UNSC.172 Although both South Korea and Japan are trying to 
improve their uneven diplomatic relations, Japan’s demand for permanent 
membership is likely to negatively affect bilateral relations between these two 
countries. 
The strategy of the collective claim by the G4 countries has so far failed 
due to division among permanent members as to which country to support for a 
permanent UNSC seat. For example, the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom support Japan, Germany, and India. Similarly, China supports Germany 
and Brazil but opposes India and Japan. China has even indicated it would block, 
if needed, Japan’s entry as a permanent member through the use of its veto 
power.173 China’s position on the Japanese membership has been consistent 
with Chinese foreign policy. Furthermore, Japan is also being seen as an ally of 
the United States.174 
C. THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) MODEL 
The African Union has demanded two permanent and two additional 
nonpermanent seats for Africa.175 Africa, with 54 countries, has maintained unity 
and consistently retained its original demand of permanent seats with all the 
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powers and privileges afforded to current permanent members of the UNSC.176 
The stance of the African leaders has, so far, prevented the G4 members from 
achieving any significant breakthrough to muster enough support of UNGA 
member states for passage of resolutions in the General Assembly.177 The 
inflexible position of the AU to demand veto power and opposition of the P5 to an 
extension of veto powers has further stalled the reform process, which is a major 
blow to the aspiration of G4 countries that had been relying on the support of the 
P5 and AU members for the charter amendment. The required two-thirds majority 
in the UNGA for the passage of resolutions for amendment of the charter is 
possible only if the G4 and the AU adopt a common position on the issue of veto 
power. 
To be sure, the AU has not identified its potential candidate, which 
announcement might divide the AU’s unity on the issue of UNSC enlargement 
because more countries would claim permanent seats for themselves.178 For 
example, to block South Africa and Egypt candidacy, Senegal also wishes to be 
a candidate for permanent membership of the UNSC from Africa.179 The United 
States has decided not to support any proposal that does not identify the 
potential candidates for UNSC’s permanent membership because according to 
McDonald and Patrick, “Regional selection could result in the seating of 
unexpected, possibly compromising candidates. Should the United States accept 
Cuba or Venezuela as a permanent UNSC member if…Brazil and Mexico cannot 
secure Latin American support?”180 Since the AU proposal does not reveal its 
future candidates, and has rather suggested to select its permanent member on 
a rotational basis, the United States is not likely to endorse the AU enlargement 
proposal.  
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The African Union enlargement model has generated two major 
controversies: an inflexible position on demand of veto power, and the selection 
of its permanent members on a rotational basis. First, the demand for veto power 
seems unrealistic, as all P5 members have rejected extension of veto power to 
new members.181 Additionally, if the AU leaders stick to their inflexible demands 
of veto power and selection of its permanent members, it would be difficult for the 
AU to muster enough support at the UNGA to secure a two-thirds majority, as a 
first step. The two-thirds majority is possible only if G4 countries and their allies, 
as well as the AU, maintain a uniform stance over their demand of veto power for 
new permanent members. Furthermore, the rigid stance of the AU has created 
division within its own organization.182 Many member states argue that demand 
for veto power is unrealistic, and it should be dropped to move the reform 
process forward.183 
Second, the AU’s demand for selection of its permanent members on a 
rotational basis is both unrealistic and flawed. For example, a member country of 
the AU can opt out of its membership because, unlike the U.N., the membership 
of the AU is not mandatory. Additionally, other regions such as Asia and Latin 
America have no single representative organization. Likewise, it is not yet clear 
what will happen if a permanent member from Africa or any other regional 
organization casts its vote against perceived interests of its region. Will the AU 
and other regional organizations retain the power to rescind the membership of 
such countries and replace them with more suitable and pliant states?  
D. UFC ENLARGEMENT MODEL 
To block G4 countries to secure a permanent seat at the council, the Ufc 
group has proposed its own enlargement model through a draft resolution, 
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A/59/L.68.184 The Ufc enlargement model is similar to that of the HLP 
enlargement Model B. The group has opposed enlargement of the council in the 
permanent category on the basis of equality and sovereignty of all member 
states enshrined in the U.N. Charter.185 The group considers that its proposals 
are win-win for all the stakeholders. Pakistan’s representative in the U.N., while 
highlighting the importance and advantages of the Ufc proposal and consensus-
based approach, stated: 
The Uniting for Consensus (Ufc) proposal offers the best basis for a 
solution that can accommodate the interests of all states. This can 
be achieved through compromise and flexibility designed to achieve 
consensus on the broadest possible agreement… The Ufc proposal 
is equitable, fair and democratic. It provides for a greater role of the 
regions in determining their representation on the Council. It has 
the necessary flexibility to accommodate the interests of all states 
and groupings in terms of their representation on the Council 
through rotation and reelection.186  
The Ufc group has also criticized the aspiring states for their inflexible 
attitude toward reforming the UNSC and stated, “After four years of 
negotiations…deep differences persist especially regarding the expansion of the 
Council and divisive ambition of some states to become permanent 
members.”187 The Ufc states maintain that the undemocratic credentials of the 
council compositions and anachronistic nature of the veto power, though a 
compulsion at the existence of the international organization at the formation 
conference, should not be further proliferated.188 While introducing the Ufc draft 
resolution in the UNGA, the Canadian permanent representative at the U.N. 
reiterated the Ufc stance on the expansion of permanent membership as follows: 
                                            
184 Sarwar, “Expansion,”257–279. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Pakistan Mission to United Nations, “Pakistan Position towards U.N. Reform,” available 
at, http://pakun.org/unreform/index.php#Security_Council_Reform.  
187 Ibid. 
188 Brian Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible 
Consequences,” South Carolina Journal of Internation Law and Business 6, no. 1 (January 2009): 
89–128. 
 53 
While we [in the Ufc Group] recognize the importance of Security 
Council reform, we want to see it achieved without unduly dividing 
the membership…It will not serve our larger purpose if we are left 
divided after choosing among resolutions that favor a few, leaving 
fissures and factions as we pick winners and losers, once and for 
all…the accession of additional permanent members to the Security 
Council is not in the best interests of the overwhelming majority of 
its member states… our purpose is not to oppose the aspirants, but 
rather to support a principle: that widening the permanent circle for 
the few who seek special status, no matter how worthy their 
candidacies, would make the Security Council less accountable for 
its conduct, more remote from the membership and less 
representative of the world’s regions.189 
The Ufc members contend that enlargement in the permanent category, 
despite opposition of significant number of important countries, would divide the 
member states rather than uniting them. To provide equal opportunity to serve at 
the most important global decision-making forum, the Ufc group proposed 
expansion of the council in the nonpermanent category only. The UNSC’s 
enlargement in the non-permanent category of the membership, the Ufc group 
argues, would accommodate future changes in the power structures as well.190 
Unlike the G4, the Ufc group is opposed to putting the enlargement 
process to vote. Instead, the group supports consensus-based enlargement of 
the UNSC and maintains that voting on the enlargement issue would be divisive 
for the international community. The group, though small in number, has 
achieved significant success in delaying the expansion process thus far. The 
group argues that the undemocratic structure of the UNSC cannot be addressed 
through an increase in the permanent category; rather an increase would only 
make it more undemocratic.  
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY AND BALANCE 
The HLP enlargement proposals and the G4 countries’ collective claim 
and demand for permanent membership for the group have caused tension at 
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the regional and global level. The G4 members represent three important regions 
in the world: Asia, Europe, and Latin America. In all these regions, G4 states 
have their strong regional rivals. The alignment of regional rivals with other 
likeminded countries in the other regions has expanded the scope of opposition 
from the simple issue of UNSC expansion to diplomatic and political 
competitions.  
In the South Asian region, Pakistan and India play an important role in the 
peace and stability of the region. Conversely, the conflict between these two 
countries can destabilize the peace and security of the entire South Asian region. 
Furthermore, in East Asia, South Korea and China are opposing Japan’s 
candidacy for the permanent membership.191 Unfriendly relations among these 
three Asian giants have the potential to cast a negative impact on the regional 
security and economy. 
The AU has so far maintained appreciable unity due to its consistent 
demand for permanent membership with veto power and demand to select the 
permanent members on a rotational basis. However, this unity is likely to be 
shattered once the AU announces its candidate for the permanent membership. 
Some internal division has been witnessed over the rigid AU stance. For 
example, to block South Africa and Egypt candidacy, Senegal also wishes to be 
a candidate for permanent membership of the UNSC from Africa.192 The division 
will further widen once the AU finalizes the candidates.  
Current proposals for expansion of the UNSC will affect the regional 
balance of power. For example, Germany’s admission to the council as a 
permanent member would give an additional seat to already overrepresented 
Western Europe. Accordingly, Japan and India would raise the number of Asian 
seats from two to three. By contrast, Latin America would have only one seat. In 
total, Africa and Latin America would have three seats; whereas, Europe would 
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have four. If examined from the perspective of international alliances and 
cooperation, an international coalition led by the United States would have a 
clear edge over its close rivals, Russia and China. All four new contenders, India, 
Japan, Germany, and Brazil, are seen as part of the U.S. coalition that will further 
strengthen the United States globally.  
Over the issue of UNSC expansion, the member states are divided into 
three major groups: G4 countries, Ufc countries, and AU. Apart from these major 
groups, certain other groups such as Arab countries and the Organization of 
Islamic Countries (OIC)—demand a permanent UNSC seat for Arab and Islamic 
countries, respectively.193 The countries that seek permanent seats such as the 
G4 and AU support the expansion of the UNSC even in the absence of 
consensus among member states through majority vote, required under Article 
39 of the U.N. charter. 
The G4 countries are desperately pushing the reform process, as these 
countries are the main beneficiaries of the current reform process. These 
countries, while agreeing that permanent membership is undemocratic and veto 
power is against the sovereign equality of the member countries, demand the 
same for themselves. While collectively seeking to secure a permanent seat, G4 
countries make their individual claims as well.  
Furthermore, Europe with 35 states and less than 20 percent of the world 
population currently holds three permanent seats—about 60 percent of the 
UNSC membership—however; with the addition of Germany, the representation 
of Europe would further increase to four permanent seats.194 Furthermore, 
admission of Japan and Germany as new permanent members would tilt the 
balance in favor of overrepresented industrialized countries. Accordingly, change 
in the current composition of the UNSC and distribution of seats based on 
geographical representation would upset the regional balance of power. For 
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example, the current proposal by G4 countries would give an additional seat to 
Western Europe, which is already overrepresented.  
The AU demand for veto power has damaged consensus between the AU 
and G4 members. The G4 countries had relied on the support of the AU for the 
required two-thirds majority in the UNGA for passage of resolution for 
amendment of the charter.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD 
Although most of the states agree to reforming and expanding the U.N. 
Security council, the expansion of the UNSC appears to be one of the most 
controversial issues of the reform process. According to Hosli et al., “Changing 
the composition and voting system of the Security Council, in an effort to 
increase the institution’s global legitimacy, is proving to be the one of the most 
difficult hurdles to overcome for global community of states represented in the 
U.N..”195  Due to conflicting interests of various groups and states, the current 
reform process of the UNSC has not made visible progress in the last two 
decades of intense efforts and negotiations. Swart states, “The lack of substantial 
outcome during the last 20 years of Security Council reform deliberations… 
seems not only a consequence of the intense power struggle being waged 
between groupings of Members States, but also rests on substantive and 
strategic differences among those professing to share specific goals.”196  
The P5 countries are against any type of expansion that erodes their 
unique power and dominance.197 The permanent members have consistently 
rejected all efforts in the past to guard and protect their special privilege.198 
According to Okhovat, “The initial reason for the inclusion of this power [veto 
power] in the Charter was to prevent the U.N. to take direct action against any of 
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its principal founding members.”199 Additionally, as previously noted, the P5 
members argue that they draw legitimacy from the Charter, and that the power 
sharing formula, agreed in San Francisco in 1945, can be altered only through 
charter amendment.200 Many scholars view permanent membership as 
undemocratic and unsupportive of the concept of sovereign equality of the states; 
however, it is difficult to undo this situation due to difficult amendment procedure 
of the U.N. Charter. In the same context, adding more permanent members to 
the UNSC would also impinge on the sovereign equality of the states.  
The reform proposals of the U.N. HLP and aspirants’ countries will benefit 
only those countries that succeed in getting permanent seats at the UNSC and 
not the regions that the permanent members are selected from. The selection of 
a specific country from a particular geographic region does not mean that that 
country would be representative of that region. Furthermore, countries selected 
as permanent members have no obligation to look after the interests of their 
respective regions. After being selected as permanent members, member states 
are not accountable to the region—only nonpermanent members remain 
accountable to the regions for their reelection. Furthermore, most of the states 
are involved in various conflicts with the regional countries, and are therefore 
likely to use the permanent membership to influence the outcome of any dispute 
in their favor. Careful analysis reveals that P5 countries have cast vetoes against 
countries of their own, respective regions. Recently, Russia has vetoed a 
resolution on Ukraine in order to block discussion on the annexation of 
Crimea.201  
Over time, aspirant countries’ relative military and economic powers may 
change, and this may change the bases of their demands and eventually make 
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their claims irrelevant.202 The countries that qualify today for permanent seats 
may not hold their same relative power status in the future. For example, the UK 
and France were both major economic and military powers when the U.N. was 
established; now other countries such as Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil have 
overtaken both these countries. This demonstrates that economic and military 
strengths are variable factors that constantly evolve. For instance, in the future, 
the second-tier countries such as Italy, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, Argentina, 
Canada, and Indonesia may achieve similar status as that of current rising 
powers. So these countries will demand permanent membership for the same 
reasons. In this context, Nadin argued, “In 20–30-40 years, new emerging 
countries such as Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey might ask the 
same question: ‘Why aren’t we on the Council?’ And so the reform debate will 
begin again.”203 
The next-tier countries fear that if the council is enlarged in the permanent 
category it will diminish their current influence. Additionally, these countries see 
no hope of another expansion of the UNSC even if the power structure changes 
because the permanent members, in all probability, would not agree to another 
charter amendment for the same reasons. 
Most of the UNSC’s failures are attributed to lack of consensus among P5 
members and not due to the broad-based representation. Furthermore, the large 
size of the UNSC would be ineffective to deal with its responsibility of preventing 
threats to peace. Expansion of the permanent membership of the UNSC would 
make the consensus among permanent members to reach an agreement on 
important disputes difficult. Often, the P5 members have failed to agree on 
important resolutions pertaining to peace and security, so in a similar situation it 
would be even more difficult for an expanded UNSC to achieve consensus. For 
instance, the council failed to take action in Rwanda to prevent genocide due to 
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the P5’s indifference and lack of interest, and not because of implementation and 
execution of UNSC’s resolutions. 
The expansion of the UNSC’s permanent category has divided the 
member states in many different ways. On the one hand, the P5 members resist 
the extension of veto power, and on the other hand, G4 countries and the AU 
members demand permanent membership including veto power. Similarly, the 
Ufc countries are not only against the extension of veto power but also against 
the permanency of the UNSC’s membership. While the veto power and 
permanent membership are outdated and undemocratic, the addition of new 
permanent members, without veto power, according to Luck, “would further 
fragment and add yet another layer to the already divisive power structure of the 
council.”204 Thus, the multilayer council, with power concentrated in the hands of 
only the P5, would be slow in making important decisions, essential for the 
maintenance of peace.205 
The main reasons given by the aspirant countries for the demand of 
expansion of the UNSC into permanent categories are contradictory and are 
dividing the member states. In the final conclusion of this study of the UNSC’s 
expansion, it is essential to evaluate the main reasons for expanding the UNSC, 
such as the small size of the council versus overall membership of the UNSC, 
lack of regional representation, and change of global power structure. In addition, 
the main impediments that have held the reform process and divided the member 
states and regions must also be reviewed. 
A. SIZE OF THE COUNCIL VERSUS OVERALL MEMBERSHIP 
Demand for the expansion of the UNSC on the basis of the small size of 
the council is unrealistic, because even after the addition of six more permanent 
members, the council would still remain small. For example, the current council 
                                            
204 Luck, Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress, 15. 
205 Ibid.; Fassbender, All Illusions Shattered? Looking Back on a Decade of Failed Attempts 
to Reform the U.N. Security Council: 183–214. 
 61 
represents approximately 8% of the overall membership; whereas after the 
addition of six more permanent members, the council representation would rise 
to approximately 13%—which is not a significant increase as compared to the 
overall membership of the council. For example, in 1945, the permanent 
members accounted for 22% of the total membership. Conversely, 25 members 
would make the size of the council too large for quick and timely decision-
making, which is essential for making prompt decisions to prevent threats to 
peace and security.  
The addition of more permanent members would further disturb the 
existing balance between permanent and nonpermanent members of the UNSC 
and would tilt the balance in favor of permanent members. For example, after the 
addition of six more permanent members to the council, the remaining 182 
members of UNGA would be left to compete for just 11 nonpermanent seats. 
The current expansion in the permanent category would add six more 
members—the G4 plus two countries from Africa.206 The addition of these 
countries, it is argued, will ensure broad-based support of the U.N. decision and 
would ultimately provide legitimacy to the council decisions, especially in the 
security area. However, if critically analyzed, support of six additional members 
would prevent rather than encourage active opposition of more than a dozen 
equally important countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Canada, South Korea, Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia. 
Unfortunately, there is a consistent struggle between rising powers—likely 
contenders for the UNSC permanent membership—and the challenger or 
second-tiered countries. For previously referenced reasons, there is always a 
strong opposition to reforming the UNSC, especially its expansion. According to 
Luck, “The universality of the United Nations has fueled dual pattern on the 
intergovernmental level: frequent calls for change by one Member state or group 
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or another, followed by blocking moves by others with divergent interests or 
perspectives.”207 
The UNSC’s expansion is a political process and not an administrative 
exercise to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the council, but rather a 
method for influential countries to gain more power at the global level. For quick 
and efficient council, the size has to be small. However, in order to accommodate 
a greater number of important countries to accrue their financial and military 
support for the implementation of the UNSC’s decisions, the change is 
considered sine qua non. It is not necessarily true that an enlarged council would 
be more efficient. For instance, the ECOSOC was enlarged in 1965 through the 
charter amendment, but its efficiency dropped since it was enlarged from 27 to 
54 members.208 
B. REGIONAL REPRESENTATION 
Regional representation at the UNSC has fragmented regional peace and 
divided countries in various groups at the regional level. The selection of 
countries as permanent members to improve representation of the 
underrepresented regions would create division within the region and would 
change regional balance and make council ineffective with regards to its primary 
responsibility of maintaining peace. The new permanent members from various 
regions would tend to guard their national interest and, as a result, would 
paralyze the council in the security field. For example, the new members from 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America would block resolutions that with current 
membership could pass. 
Permanent membership runs counter to the democratic spirit of 
accountability and equality. The permanent members are not accountable to their 
electors and therefore do not feel obligated to look after the region. In 
democracy, elected members are accountable to their electors—in this the 
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member states—but in case of permanent membership, the permanent members 
are not accountable to their electors and thus feel no obligation to look after their 
regions’ interests. The new permanent members should be accountable to the 
regional countries to strengthen the regional organization. 
C. CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF NEW PERMANENT MEMBERS 
Although G4 countries are the rising economic and military powers and 
have made significant contributions toward maintenance of peace and security, 
these countries do not fulfill all the criteria mentioned in the UNSG report, “In 
larger freedom.”209 For example, Japan and Germany are top financial 
contributors to the U.N.-assessed budget, but their troop contributions for the 
U.N. peacekeeping operations are negligible. Similarly, India is among the top 
TCC but its financial contribution to the U.N.-assessed budget is just 0.666 
percent of its GDP—below South Korea (1.994 percent), Italy (4.448 percent), 
Mexico (1.842 percent), Canada (2.984 percent), Spain (2.973 percent), Turkey 
(1.328 percent), and Switzerland (1.047 percent).210 
Furthermore, the United States has given its own selection criteria for the 
selection of new permanent members, which includes “GDP, population, military 
capacity, contribution to peacekeeping, commitment to the democracy and 
human rights, financial contributions to the U.N., non-proliferation and counter-
terrorism record, and geographic balance.”211 So far, the United States has 
supported India and Japan for permanent membership.  
Permanent members of the UNSC are seen as global players due to the 
powers and role of the UNSC in the important responsibility of maintaining peace 
and security in the world. These countries need to compete at the global rather 
than regional level. For example, any country to be selected to represent Africa 
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as a permanent member would be much less suitable than some of the other 
countries in various other regions. For example, South Korea, Spain, Italy, and 
Indonesia contribute much more than any African countries, but these countries 
would not be selected because India and Japan are strong candidates from Asia. 
The regional-based selection of permanent members would create dissension 
and disappointment among important and influential regional countries, which 
would weaken regional balance and affect cooperation.  
D. THE WAY FORWARD 
The decades of serious attempts to enlarge the UNSC’s permanent 
category have not made any visible progress due to conflicting interests of 
important member states. Additionally, resistance by the P5 to share its powers 
and the difficult procedure to amend the charter to add more permanent 
members has stalled the reform process. The inequality among member states, 
though an undemocratic exercise, was accepted under the extraordinary 
situation of World War II. The 51 member states that participated in the formation 
conference of the U.N. were either allies of the P5 or were too weak to challenge 
the power states that had proved their military might during WW II. However, it is 
difficult for member states to agree to such inequality today. 
Under current circumstance, the way forward in the UNSC reform process 
is to enlarge the nonpermanent category. However, to provide stability to the  
nonpermanent category of the membership, the term of  nonpermanent elected 
council members may be enhanced from the current two years to four or five 
years with the provision of immediate reelection. This change would reduce 
frustration among the rising powers and provide equal opportunity to all countries 
that are performing efficiently at the council. This process would also enable the 
member states to vote out those countries that have consistently failed to 
perform per the wishes and expectation of the majority of member states.212 
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Enlargement of the UNSC’s nonpermanent category is not opposed by the P5 
members. 
Furthermore, nonpermanent members will be accountable to their small 
regional countries for reelection, which will strengthen the regional organization. 
The strong regional organization would enhance UNSC capacity to deal quickly 
and efficiently with any threat to peace. Furthermore, Article 52 of the U.N. 
Charter recognizes the role of the regional organizations in maintenance of 
peace.213 According to the U.N. Charter, “Nothing in the present Charter 
precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with 
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security… 
provided that such arrangements are consistent with the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations.”214 
E. REFLECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION 
AND PAKISTAN IN CASE INDIA BECOMES A PERMANENT MEMBER 
1. Implications for the South Asian Region 
India is a big country and has remained relatively democratic since its 
independence in 1947. It has contributed a large troop commitment toward the 
U.N. peace efforts in the world. India has provided leaders for both civilian and 
military leadership to the U.N. India has the third-largest military and is bracing to 
become a rising economic power in the world. India, along with the other G4 
countries, is striving for permanent membership in the UNSC, which will further 
increase its influence in the world and South Asian region. 
India, however, has a number of disputes with its small regional countries, 
especially Pakistan. Interestingly, all South Asian countries border India, but do 
not have contiguous borders with each other. Therefore, most of the South Asian 
countries, being India’s neighbor, depend on India’s support for their security and 
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economic assistance. For instance, Nepal and Bhutan are landlocked countries 
and depend on Indian seaports for their trade. Additionally, Bangladesh has 
unresolved border and water dispute with India. Similarly, Sri Lanka has suffered 
from Tamil’s insurgency that was supported by India. 
Both India and Pakistan have failed to resolve their disputes peacefully 
and have fought four major wars over these disputes since 1947. As an 
influential regional state, India has failed to play the required leadership role to 
amicably solve its problems with its small neighbors. India, however, considers 
that its neighbours are its enemies and regards them as subordinate states. 
Thus, India’s permanent membership of the UNSC will have serious implications 
for the South Asian region. 
India will pursue its own interest and objectives and will not pay any heed 
to regional issues, involving smaller regional states. In the past, India has 
violated UNSC’s resolution and is not likely to respect these resolutions in the 
future as well. India can isolate and intimidate smaller regional states through 
economic strangulation and by involving them in political problems and disputes. 
India can politically and militarily interfere in the internal affairs of smaller regional 
countries on various pretexts, and at the same time can prevent U.N. intervention 
through India’s influence as a permanent member. Giving a permanent seat to 
India at this stage would likely raise the chances of serious armed conflicts in the 
region. 
2. Implications for Pakistan 
India has a complex and troubled relationship with Pakistan. It began with 
the single dispute of Kashmir215 in 1947, but after half a century and four wars, 
more disputes have emerged in the process, and there is a likelihood of further 
proliferation of these disputes. The entry of India into the UNSC as its permanent 
member would greatly upset Pakistan’s economic and foreign policy objectives 
and would have the following implications for Pakistan. 
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a. Kashmir  
Kashmir is the major dispute between Pakistan and India. Pakistan wants 
a just resolution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the spirit of UNSC 
resolutions—the UNSC resolution maintained the issue of Jammu and Kashmir 
be determined through plebiscite as per the wishes of the people of Kashmir. The 
U.N. HLP report also refers to the Kashmir dispute as one of the “oldest and 
unresolved disputes on the UNSC agenda.”216 To silence the popular demand of 
the people of Jammu and Kashmir, India has deployed a huge military 
contingent, which is involved in the worst kind of human right violations. 
According to Noorani, “Indian Security Forces have systematically, and with 
impunity, perpetrated outrageous violations of human rights in the [Kashmir] 
valley.”217 Today, Pakistan and India are nuclear power; even small conflict may 
conflagrate to nuclear exchange which will devastate the entire South Asian 
region. Without settlement of the Kashmir dispute, use of force cannot be ruled 
out. Noorani contends that, “It is reasonable to conclude that relations between 
India and Pakistan will never be normal until the Kashmir dispute is settled.”218 
Without resolution of the Kashmir dispute, India does not qualify to be a 
member of the UNSC. India has refused to implement the resolutions of the 
UNSC over settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It would be unjust to award 
membership of the council to a country that has violated its resolution. As a 
permanent member of the UNSC, India can influence favorable decisions at the 
UNSC over Kashmir. Furthermore, India, due to its strong conventional military, 
can resort to the use of force on the pretext of pre-emption or hot pursuit to 
coerce Pakistan to change its stance on Kashmir in favor of India.  
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India has been able to draw out the issue of Kashmir for over 68 years, 
intending to wait for the opportune moment to accrue maximum benefit. The 
permanent seat at the Council is one such moment through which India can 
extract a favorable outcome. The UNSC Resolution 38219 is the oldest resolution 
of the UNSC, which is still waiting for its final and just disposal. India has rejected 
the role of the international community and considers the Kashmir dispute to be a 
bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, however, the 
bilateralism has failed because of India’s brinkmanship and failure to accept 
Kashmir as a disputed territory. 
b. Economic Implications 
The economic power of India backed by strong diplomatic weight could be 
devastating for Pakistan’s economy. India could destroy Pakistan’s economy by 
making Pakistan run dry by stopping the flow of western rivers, guaranteed to 
Pakistan under bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan—the Indus Water 
treaty (IWT). By disregarding the international binding of the World Bank as 
Guarantor in the IWT, India could obliterate the agro-based economy of Pakistan, 
which is a mainstay of Pakistan’s economy. The permanent membership would 
afford India an enormous advantage to block resolutions brought before the 
UNSC by Pakistan. Furthermore, as a permanent member of the UNSC, India 
could use its influence over international financial institutions, such as the 
International Monitory Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to prevent Pakistan’s 
access to these institutions; this would greatly damage Pakistan’s already weak 
economy.220 Likewise, all permanent members are represented on various 
committees.  
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c. Sachin and Sir Creek Issues 
The Indian Army secretly occupied Siachin Glacier221—a glaciated portion 
of Himalayan mountain range, between India and Pakistan, which was an 
undemarcated portion of the India–Pakistan border—a no-man’s-land. India’s 
unilateral action in Siachin created a new issue in Pakistan–India relations.222 
India could influence the outcome of Siachin to its liking if it became a permanent 
member of the UNSC. 
Sir Creek223 is an issue of demarcation of the water channel between 
Pakistan and India. The creek was part of the Sindh Province of Pakistan before 
the independence of India and Pakistan; however, India has consistently refused 
to accept that demarcation and has instead been demanding possession of the 
complete creek.224 Since India and Pakistan’s independence, the issue remains 
unsettled between both countries. After becoming a member of the UNSC, India 
could assert greater diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to solve the issue in a 
manner that best suits India. 
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India’s entry into the elite club would greatly upset Pakistan’s security and 
economic concerns and would create an imbalance in the region. India’s 
permanent membership of the UNSC would cause further proliferation of 
disputes in the region, especially between India and Pakistan. To qualify for the 
permanent membership of the UNSC, India must solve main disputes such as 
Kashmir, Siachen, and Sir Creek. 
Pakistan, as a key regional country, must continue to work closely with 
members of the Ufc group to argue in favor of increase of non-permanent and                  
non-permanent membership of the UNSC to block India’s entry as a permanent 
member. Pakistan and the Ufc members must try to capitalize on the differences 
between the G4 and the AU to prevent G4 states from achieving the required 
two-thirds majority at the UNGA.  
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